Neuroscience and Free Will

A friend of mine from lab recently sent me this article, which I rather enjoyed and thought I'd talk about for a bit.

The article addresses a couple of recent neuroscience research projects that potentially have implications for the free will vs. determinism debate. The results of these studies speak to a relatively new phenomenon that has become something of a concern for philosophers engaging in this discussion: What if, with the assistance of an fMRI machine or other form of observation, we can more accurately predict a person's future behavior than they can? Does this automatically mean that we don't possess free will?

I liked this article because it broke down the finer points of the argument quite nicely, firstly pointing out the holes in the study being examined (which was able to show brain activity leading up to a 'decision-making' event up to 7 seconds before the subject reported making the decision), then by slowly revealing that the term 'free will' is irresponsibly vague.

In both philosophy and science, it is necessary to define terms with a certain level of concreteness, otherwise nothing can be determined for sure. If you can't agree on the variable to be measured, then you can't measure it, and you certainly can't draw conclusions about it. This is a big problem when addressing free will, because there are subconscious processes that take place in the brain, and they (apparently) can apply to decision-making.

If I subconsciously initiate a decision, then a few seconds later it floats into my conscious mind, and a few seconds after that, I engage in the behavior specified by that decision, then who made it? Who am "I?" Does the entity of "Amanda" encompass my subconscious mind, which is very much involved in my thoughts, emotions and decisions, but which I cannot openly detect? Or is my subconscious this puppet-master that I cannot deny or fight? And what if my conscious desires are in direct conflict with my subconscious desires? Do I have the ability to overturn decisions that I wasn't even aware I had already made?

The joke here is that a simple fMRI will never address these questions, and that is why neuroscientists and philosophers will always butt heads. But I'm confident that the struggle itself will yield answers, and in the meantime, we'll understand something more about brain behavior, which is always useful information.

For me, the free will vs. determinism debate is a futile one. I will never know what "me" is. Where do I sit? In my hippocampus? In my frontal lobe? In a delicate network spanning multiple systems in my central nervous system? Where do I end? And if determinism somehow turns out to be the true answer, who cares? I still feel the satisfaction of choice, even if it isn't real. I'm still happy with the circumstances of my life, so long as someone else doesn't take hold of it. I still know, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that there is a "me," even if neuroscience eventually proves otherwise.

I think, therefore I am. Even if an fMRI can't find me.